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Sunday, 27 October 2013

Transformations of Romanness

[I am off to Vienna to a conference with the same title as this post, which is also the title of my contribution.  This is a much longer version of the paper I will give, which will dwell on the changes after 476, but it is a draft of the version I hope to publish.

Update 25/11/2014: I have updated this post now so that is the same as that submitted for publication, rather than the text that was delivered in Vienna.]

***
 
No identity can remain fixed and stable.  Any perspective informed by modern continental philosophy cannot fail to see any primordialist position on ethnic identity as fundamentally wrong-headed.  Identity is a question of desire, of a ‘motion towards’ an ideal.  The ideal, naturally, is unattainable.  No identity is coextensive with itself, nor can it be, except among the dead (which opens a different perspective on the study of identity in early medieval cemeteries).  What makes an identity is, furthermore, always something more than itself; something in other words that – in elementary Lacanian – operates at least as much in the realm of the imaginary as in that of the symbolic.  This is why external markers or signs of distinction never suffice.  An identity is always constructed in part by what it is not, however that negation is articulated.  In this purely symbolic sense it is no different from any other sign, operating within a chain of metaphor and difference.  It is impossible to separate an identity from its alterity, from its negations.  This is one reason why it makes no sense to study ‘othering’ or alterity as some sort of process distinct from identity-construction.[1]  A strategy of distinction is always at the self-same time a strategy of identification, and vice versa, bound together like the two sides of a Möbius Strip.  To raise a common identity in a social interaction is simultaneously to raise those things that both actors share in notbeing and those things that they do not share.  The things held to constitute an identity, those things which are ‘in it more than itself’ are contingent, ever changing, and yet, at any one moment, always constructed as timeless and essential.  In any given context, an identity is always already what it is.  This is yet another reason to mistrust views that portray something like Gothic identity as an unchanging monolith.
In my 2007 book Barbarian Migrations and the Roman WestI included a long discussion of ethnicity in which I made a number of points which, sadly, I do not think have made much impact on the study of the topic.[2]  One is the that ethnicity is multi-layered, so that ethnic change is much moreabout the acquisition of new layers and the reshuffling of old ones through time than it is about swapping one for another.  It is this misguided notion that is at stake, for example, in Patrick Amory’s work and in Peter Heather’s critiques of it.[3]  I argued that everything that we might say about what we consider to be an unproblematic ‘ethnic’ identity at the level to which I will, here, provisionally (with full recognition of the problems of the term) refer as ‘gentile’ (i.e. as a gens‘people’) can be applied to identities that come at perhaps lower levels, which might loosely (but misleadingly) be described as residential, local or regional.[4]  I then made the point that what we think of as the appropriately ‘ethnic’ (i.e. ‘gentile’, as above) level within this arc of the spectrum of identities is contingent upon historical circumstance.  Ethnicity is dynamic.  I hypothesized that a break-up of the UK into regional units might lead to a situation where a Yorkshire identity was considered more important than an English or British one.  Again, the point concerns layers of ethnicity and their contingent reordering as part of the dynamics of historical change.  Hierarchies of identity might be reordered in the opposite direction too.  Some of us would rather be seen as British than English and as European rather than British.  The study of Roman identity, its many levels and its change through time, is an excellent case study of these points.  There are other reasons why the topic is important.

Deconstructing the tortured historiography of Roman ethnicity

Derrida said that ‘deconstruction is what happens’ (‘ce qui arrive’) in a reading.[5]  Let me offer a little deconstruction of my own previous writing.  In Gregory of Tours’ account of the various diplomatic comings and goings in late sixth-century Gaul, he describes one embassy as including ‘Warinar [or Warmar] the Frank and Firminus the Arvernian’.[6] Another comprised ‘Bodegisil the son of Mummolenus from Soissons, Evantius the son of Dynamius from Arles, and Grippo the Frank.’[7]  In my own work,[8]I have used these references to talk, first, about what a Frank was in Gregory’s writings and, second, about the northern Gallic aristocracy and why Gregory did not think there was a Frankish nobility.  Yet what one might term the ‘repressed other’ of the discussion is represented precisely by the two non-Frankish characters, Firminus and Evantius.  What of their identity, which Gregory specifically tells us about in terms that seem to mark its structural equivalence to francus: sessionicus and arelatensis?[9]  What passes without discussion is what it meant to be an Arvernian or from Arles, or – if Mummolenus’ sons weren’t identified as Franks – from Soissons.   
I am, however, in good company.  A similar deconstructive reading of Walter Pohl’s writings illustrates, as I hope to show, how a crucial misunderstanding has come about and how the present volume might deal with and ameliorate the results of that, to move the debate on in productive fashion.  The debate – maybe dispute would be better – between Walter Pohl and Walter Goffart is well known.  It causes me some distress.  I have friends on both sides – I like to think that I get on well with both of the principals – and no one likes to see their friends arguing so bitterly.  Most of the rudeness has come from the western shore of the Atlantic, but rudeness is not the only, and certainly not the most effective, form of academic aggression.  This confrontation has long perplexed me, largely because I have strained to see exactly what the ‘Toronto School’s’ objection to the ‘Vienna School’ was.
I should not have to make clear that Walter Pohl’s works have been immensely valuable and important to me, or that I am almost entirely in agreement with its principal conclusions.  Both points should be visible from my own previous writings. It must furthermore be stressed that deconstruction is not in and of itself a hostile move.  As any aficionado of Derrida’s writing knows, it is a recognition of a text’s, or a body of writing’s, quality, importance and value.  Having thus made clear that what follows is motivated not by hostility or confrontation but by respect and friendship I should like to discuss what seemed to me to emerge from a deconstructive re-reading of as much of the Pohl oeuvre as was available to me, especially the classics of the corpus.[10] 
Throughout this work, the analysis of what makes (or does not make) and what distinguishes (or does not) a people remains at the level of those groups which have always been considered to be peoples: Franks, Goths, Lombards, Burgundians and the rest, for whom the constitutive outside is indeed formed by the Romans, the Roman Empire.  For example, in his classic article, ‘Telling the difference’, Walter Pohl asked what it meant to be (inter alia) a citizen of the civitasof Tours.[11]  That part of the question, however, was never answered.  That type of identity, Wir-Gefühl or whatever played no further role in the discussion.  The ‘repressed other’ throughout the text is the non-ethnic group, whatever (if ever) that was or might have been.  Put another way, the analysis (however subtle, persuasive and brilliant) remains at the level of the ethnic groups that have alwaysbeen considered to be ethnic groups and which have always been the ethnic players in the story: the barbarians.  It will become clear below that this is in fact commonplace in discussions of early medieval ethnicity, from all historiographical camps, but the inevitable point is that if one limits the discussion in this way, to those social units which have always been held, a priori, to be ethnic groups, the argument runs a strong risk of circularity, or at least of simply reaffirming its initial premises.
What has therefore escaped the discussion thus far is how the Turoni, Arverni and Bituriges, or the Gauls, Spaniards and Italians, differed from each other, or what the difference was between those ethnic taxonomies and that of the Germani.  Was a Batavian any more different from a Frank than from a Treverian?  I doubt it, but then I think we have not sufficiently carefully kept the analysis of the Roman-Barbarian dichotomy separate from that of the taxonomic ethnography that pervades our sources.  And yet, the deconstructive reader of the Pohl oeuvre (as it stood before the 2013 Vienna conference) will see an effective division between Germani– who have ethnic groups – and Romans – who, within the explicit discussion of the texts published thus far, seem not to have.  Also visible is the persistence of the type of identity, which earlier I provisionally labelled gentile (identity as a people), as something somehow ‘special’, vis-à-vis other types of identity that could and should be positioned within the same, ‘ethnic’ part of any map of identities.  On that basis, whether one likes it or not, seeing ethnicity in the Pohl oeuvre as a means of clothing old-style invading barbarians in new garb is one possible legitimate reading.  This is permitted by two aporias: silences, or rather by the spaces left by those silences, which represent a ‘blockage’ in the reading of a text where interpretation can proceed no further but must follow the reader’s choice.[12]  These are points of undecidability.  One point is the silence about what distinguishes an ethnic group from a non-ethnic group within the same part of the spectrum, or layering, of identities.  The other is the silence about what distinguishes such identities or layers of identity among the barbarians from their equivalents among the Romans, or more accurately among the inhabitants of the Roman Empire.
Now, as it happens, it is vital to point out that a deconstructive reader will encounter precisely the same aporetic silences – if anything – more easily, in the works of some of Pohl’s critics, and indeed with more serious consequences for their arguments, as we shall see.  Leaving that aside for the moment, however, I would like to propose, in the interests of attempting to bridge the historiographical divide, that it is in the silent spaces of these aporias that the misunderstanding between the Toronto and Vienna ‘schools’ originates.  The Toronto school views the silences as constitutive, integral to the argument.  By contrast, in my own previous readings of the corpus Pohlianus, I never have assigned them any significance.  I admit some positive curiosity about them but I perceived them more as a sign of incompletion, as a space yet to be filled, as an area where the argument could be advanced.  The Toronto School’s critique, by contrast, is – as I see it – based on a reading of those silences that suggests that they imply a genealogical link to the more traditional Lehre of ‘Germanic’ history.  Now, just as long as one sees the critique as based upon extant silenceswithin the Pohl argument, and just as long as one acknowledges that an argument is composed of its silences as well as its statements, one must concede that the Toronto critique is based on a valid reading.  If one does not accept this, one must continue either, as I did, to be unable to recognise the works of Walter Pohl in the Toronto critiques thereof and – in consequence – to be simply bemused about what was going on, or more actively to see them as a malicious and wilful distortion.  I do not think that the last option is justified either.  There may have been malice involved – certainly the critique could have been expressed in less hostile and offensive language – but I do not think there has been deliberate distortion.
This, I think, suggests why the two sides have continued to talk past each other and how such bitterness and anger has arisen.  To repeat: what is at stake is silence and, when silence is at stake, ‘I never said that’ will never be an adequate riposte.  Hence, as I see it, one side’s frustration with the other for not dealing with what is actually written on the page and the other side’s frustration that their opponents seem to refuse to answer its criticism.  When the space exposed by those silences opens onto the traditional Lehre of the Völkerwanderung and thence – inevitably – to Nazis, and where the two principals are of the precise respective heritages of those involved here, unsurprisingly tempers will flare and would have done, I suspect, even if the critique had been made in less deliberately (or carelessly) provocative terms.
The point about an aporia, or an aporetic silence, as here, is that it is, in Derridian terms, a space of différance, where a choice between two undecidable options can only be made on the basis of a purely political decision.  Put another way, as intimated above, the text itself provides no empirical pointer so one must decide for oneself, for one’s own reasons, what the silence means.  Thus the debate becomes as tribal as it has done: almost ethnic (meta-ethnic?) in itself.  That is why we have made so little progress in resolving the issue, for all the debate’s heat.  Not dealing with those aporia in the argument, once pointed out, though, will not merely not close up that space; it will actively keep it open.  That is why this volume and the conference upon which it was based are so important.  They overtly address – or should do – both of the silent spaces I have mentioned.  I am not the sort to argue for cosily artificial rapprochement or, worse, consensus but one of the many tributes one can pay to Walter Pohl is that, in spite of the calumniation he has received, he has continued to talk to the Toronto historians.  What I hope for from addressing those aporias is – one way or another – the provision of something concrete and decidable, on the basis of which those of us with no tribal affiliation can make a choice.

Roman Identity

Roman identity serves as a particularly good case study of the multi-layered, situational and dynamic nature of ethnic identity.  Let us return to Gregory of Tours.  Edward James and Walter Goffart have both argued that ethnicity was not important for Gregory.[13]  Why not?  Because he rarely ascribes a ‘gentile’ identity to the people in his stories.  He does not talk all that often about franci; saxones crop up a couple of times, once famously or infamously cutting their hair and dressing in the Breton style; a Goth makes an appearance here and there; and that is about that.  But the Historiae are full of people identified by civitas.  James says that Gregory identifies himself not as a Roman but as an Arvernian.[14]  That sort of identity, according to civitas or in some cases, as with the men of Champagne, ducatus, was – very obviously – something that mattered a lot in Gregory’s world.[15]  There is nothing that allows us analytically to distinguish these types of identity from the ‘gentile’ level. 
Let us pause here to note the implicit assumption within James’ and Goffart’s articles: that ethnicity is a level of identity equating with ‘people’ generally (that is to say it operates, in the term provisionally adopted here, at the ‘gentile’ level) and with Germanic people specifically.  Presumably, ethnicity can only have mattered to Gregory if his works were filled with descriptions of the characters in his tales as ‘Franks’, ‘Goths’ or ‘Saxons’ or, for James, if he had self-identified as ‘Roman’ (apparently in opposition to Frankish).  This is a point of considerable interest, not least because it marks a point at which Pohl’s and Goffart’s writings come together and indeed join those of many other writers on the topic.  For Pohl and Goffart equally, as for James (and the early Halsall), ethnicity and its importance is to be judged according to the usage of Germanic ethnonyms as markers of identity.  The implication of Goffart’s article is that people had no ethnic identity of any significance if that was not ‘Germanic’.  The fact that the Libri Historiarum are replete with Arverni, Turoni, Lemovici, Turnacenses, Bituriges and the rest is a point which, for Goffart, seems to have no bearing at all upon the question of the political importance of ethnic identity in Gregory’s Gaul.  Indeed, close reading and comparison of the Goffart and Pohl corpora reveals that ‘Germanic’ ethnicity is far more real for Goffart (and his followers, especially Callander Murray[16]) than for Pohl.  The crucial issues are these: first, in Goffart’s view these Germanic ethnic groups did not bring down the Roman Empire and were of no historical significance whereas, for Pohl, whether or not they brought down the Empire, ethnically-named political groups were of central importance in the political changes of the fifth and sixth centuries; and second, Goffart reads Pohl’s argument (as above) as a refiguring of the old view of the conquest of the Roman Empire by Germanic peoples.[17]  Indeed – ironically – it may actually be his own view of ethnicity (especially ‘Germanic’) and its reality that predisposes Goffart to read Pohl in this way.
Returning to Gregory of Tours and the precise problem of Roman identity, one must ask why the bishop of Tours avoids the designation of Romani for those people he identifies by civitas or ducatus.  Any answer must acknowledge first of all that this was nothing new; Roman ethnicity had always worked at multiple levels.[18]  Another key problem in so much discussion of late antique ethnicity is the failure to tease out or consistently analyse these different levels.  Especially important – and perhaps confusing for the issue – is the fact that the concept of ‘Roman’ functioned at a structural as well as a taxonomic level and that these two levels could sometimes be run together.  By the structural level I mean the use of the terms ‘Roman’ and ‘barbarian’ to mark an important organisational, cultural difference between civilised and savage.  By the taxonomic level I mean the way in which the world was described as divided up into the territories of different peoples.[19]  The two different levels are well illustrated by the two parts of Tacitus’ Germania.  The first section differentiates the Germani, qua barbarians, from the Romans in a way that, as has long been noted, cannot really be read other than as a critique of Roman society and politics under Domitian; the second half gives a taxonomy of the Germanic peoples, with few or no points of contact with the first section.[20]  Like any identity, Roman identity operated in the symbolic and imaginary realms (as above)[21].  The crucial point is that the structural level of Roman identity – that which has barbarian as its opposite or other – functions almost entirely in the imaginary register and even then in a mainly self-referential way; the taxonomic level works in the symbolic to a much greater degree.  The term Romanus may confuse the issue by (unlike barbarus) being capable of being used in both levels but it is analytically vital to keep them distinct.  Failure to do that has bedevilled much study of late antique ethnicity.  The opposite of barbarus is romanus; the opposite of, say, Francusis not.
The structural level mapped onto the taxonomic in historically-contingent ways.  Caesar, for example, described the Gallic and Germanic peoples but there is no sense from Tacitus’ historical writings that the movement of the imperial limes in the intervening century and a half had much altered this taxonomy.[22]  When Ammianus launched into his periodic ethnic excursus it makes little difference whether he is talking of areas inside or outside the imperial frontiers.[23]  The whole world was made up of different peoples with their own characteristics.  Plenty of fourth-century evidence backs up the idea that the Romans thought of the world within the limes as a mosaic of different ethne.[24]  The late Roman popularity of works on the origines of those people, within which genre post-imperial origines gentiumare surely to be located, makes this clearer still.[25] 
Thus, contrary to what Walter Goffart has written,[26]one of the many interesting things that happened to the Roman Empire in the fifth century was not that it ran into a wave of ethnicity.  Ethnic identity was alive and well throughout imperial history.  The problem, noted above, is that Goffart’s work contains the same aporia, the same silence concerning what differentiates an ethnic from a non-ethnic identity and about what differentiated an intra-imperial ethnic group or identity from an extra-imperial one.  Throughout Goffart’s work they remain tacitly present and unchallenged, and with a much more serious impact upon his argument.

The Development of Roman Identity to c.476

The questions I wish to examine in the remainder of this paper are, first, how and especially why Roman ethnicity should have defaulted to the civitaslevel by Gregory’s day; and, second, why it then got worse.  In Salic Law, the Romans are clearly a parallel population to the Franks, even if legally disadvantaged in some ways.[27]  A century or so later, the Romani of Lex Ribvaria are just one of several semi-free categories, all of which must have a Ripuarian speak for them at law.[28]  That situation would have been unthinkable even a century earlier, let alone in 400. 
An answer to this question requires us to consider the role of Romanness, as a supra-regional, imperial identity in the process of subjectivization.  Here in important ways, the taxonomic and the structural come together with the political and cultural.  Romanness was central to the formation of the political subject.  What was held to distinguish man from woman also distinguished Roman and barbarian, and human and animal: moderation, control of the emotions, reason.  These aspects learned during socialisation, paideia, enabled participation in legitimate government and rendered Roman forms of government superior to others.  Movement towards the ideal legitimised behaviour and authority of all sorts.  Movement away – real or alleged – had the opposite effect.  Control over the political centre, the imperial court, enabled one to define who was and who was not behaving in the correct legitimate fashion or moving in the right direction.  Thus Roman identity, as something moved towards, was central to the sex-gender system and to political legitimacy.  This transcended taxonomy.  As is well known, a barbarian could behave in such a ‘Roman’ fashion that his non-Roman origins were held of no account or – more correctly – were held simply in the taxonomic register, just as we may suppose were the origins of a Spaniard, Gaul or African at the imperial court.  This should not be controversial.[29]
Nonetheless, the point just made is worth stressing.  In the taxonomic sense, Romans had always had multiple layers of identity: as a citizen of the Empire; as originating in one of the major imperial regions, whether or not fossilised as dioceses in the Diocletianic Empire (Britain, Gaul, Spain, Africa, etc.); as the inhabitant of a particular province or civitas.  The writings of the Gallic authors of the late Empire make this last level very clear.[30]  Someone could claim different civitates as bases of identity from paternal and maternal descent.[31]  Perhaps there were lower, nested levels too, based around lesser settlements or communities, or pagi.[32] 
None of these levels differs fundamentally from a ‘gentile’ or similar identity.[33]  The tribal origins of the Gallic and British civitates in any case made them ’gentile’ identities of a sort.  Classical ethnography provided a resource for the assigning of characteristics to such identities.  We can see this in Ausonius’ jibes about a British rival or in Ammianus’ comments on the Gauls, and their differences from the Italians, or on the Pannonians who came to pre-eminence under Valentinian, or, earlier, in Cassius Dio’s ascriptions of Caracalla’s diverse personal defects to his family’s origins in different regions.[34]
It is by no means clear that any of these identities functioned differently in social relations within the Empire – that is at a level below a shared Roman political identity – from barbarian confederate or tribal identities or origins: a resource for differentiation, assimilation or other relationships.  Classical ethnography played a part of course as can be seen in Ammianus’ criticism – or praise – of the inhabitants of different regions.[35]  That makes it difficult to assume a different treatment at this level of identity, of people from within or without the limes.  The late Roman army’s élite auxilia palatina included regiments named after Celts and Batavians as well as after Franks and Saxons.[36]  That sort of ethnographic taxonomy played on the kinds of bio-geographical pseudo-science that was held to explain the civilised:barbarian dichotomy, so the two aspects bled into one another.[37]  This further emphasises my point about the contingency and analytical interchangeability of different levels of ethnicity.
Crucial to the development of Roman identities are the changes in the Roman army in the fourth century and its so-called barbarization.  The extent to which this was an actual matter of real non-Roman influence can be debated, as in Barbarian Migrations, where I argued suggested the existence of a certain ‘barbarian chic’ that might usefully be considered as an analogue for the nineteenth-century French Zouaves: French troops who wore a French idea of North African native dress and who adopted a number of other North African cultural practices, all of which gave then a tremendous esprit de corps.[38]  It nevertheless seems clear that following the division of civil and military services the army began to create a set of new identities that centred on the very antitheses of the civic Roman masculine ideal: animal, ferocious, braggart, barbarian.[39]  Such would of course form only one level of identity, nested within and as contingent as the others.  Nonetheless that represents a crucial development that provided a hugely important resource within the political and social developments of the fifth century.
The key feature of fifth-century politics, especially after Valentinian III’s assassination, was faction fighting between groups made up of Romans andbarbarians.  A failure to control the centre, or a defeat by those who did, led factions cut off from traditional legitimation of status to seek other forms of legitimate political authority.   In this context, the barbarized military model of Romanness was very valuable to an aristocracy used to serving in or working alongside a ‘barbarised’ army.    This surely eased the transition to the state of affairs around the 470s, where a series of regional factions existed, each grouped around a particular army, none of which was able both to gain lasting and secure control of the political centre and defeat, and establish legitimate dominance over, the others.
In the course of the fifth century, barbarian military leaders had, as Michael Kulikowski has very clearly shown, using insights from postcolonial theory, developed a particular pattern of behaviour with regard to the imperial court.[40]  This involved stressing the stereotypical, threatening role of the barbarian when outside the circles of legitimate authority, as a means of being reintegrated into the latter, when such identities were dropped.  Crucially, though, Roman military commanders seem to have picked up this model of behaviour too in the mid- to late fifth century.  This, as I have argued, involved the adoption of the quintessential gentile title of rexas a basis for an authority that could be dealt with legitimately by Romans.[41]

The Development of Roman Identity c.476-c.550

So we arrive at the situation that seems to have predominated between about 476 and the middle of the sixth century, when a Roman civil aristocracy and administration served alongside a barbarian army.  This situation was importantly different from that which existed 100 years earlier but nevertheless was clearly descended and developed from the latter.  It is important to stress that this was not a situation of straightforward binary oppositions but one of nested levels of identity.  In the bizarre political situation that existed in the half century between Romulus Augustulus’ deposition and the death of Theodoric, when I would argue that people were aware that the Western Roman Empire was no longer functioning but not that it had ended, it is unsurprising that discussions of Roman identity largely took the form of discussions of legal relationships between Roman citizens and barbarian soldiers.  This can be seen in the famous texts of Ostrogothic Italy, or in Salic or Burgundian Law.[42]  Otherwise, as with the slightly earlier writings of Sidonius Apollinaris, they concerned the traditional underpinnings of Roman identity: culture, education and so on.[43]  Yet at the same time the Roman aristocracy’s militarisation continued, as is well known.  Simultaneously, the Church was adopting classical aspects of Roman civic masculinity and was, in some areas, such as Gaul, becoming a focus of Roman aristocratic competition.  Here too, though, there was change and an opposition to a very un-Roman competitive asceticism.[44]
It is difficult to see how this situation could fail to cause the renegotiation of Roman identity.  As I stated at the beginning, identity is a motion towards, an issue of desire.  Any identity depends upon a set of ideal images and commensurate oppositions.  In the situation that was emerging in the course of the fifth century the oppositions were neither as pronounced nor as negative.  The political advantages of Romanness were lesser, too.  That did not mean that there were no attractions.  In the strange ‘sleepwalking’ period after 476 the emperor remained the ultimate political reference point, in whom barbarian soldier and Roman civilian, and the legitimation of the forms of authority invested in both, came together.[45]
The situation is perhaps very well illustrated in the Pactus Legis Salicae, where Romani and Franci have seemingly well-defined functions but both have access to the king.[46]  The Franks have legal privilege, which is hugely significant, but the image is of two parallel populations.  We should not teleologically assume that this situation was destined to develop along particular lines.  The world after 476 contained many possibilities.
One of these possibilities was the re-establishment of unity by military action.  In c.510 there existed a situation wherein two kings, Clovis and Theodoric, having between them established dominance over almost the whole western Empire, faced off against each other.  Both were evidently happy to be addressed as augustusby Roman subjects, even if neither formally adopted the title.[47]  To contemporaries, this situation may well have seemed simply like the next, perhaps decisive, round in the struggle between the Gallic and Italian factions that had dominated fifth-century western politics.  Had such a play-off come about, and been as decisive as many other battles of the period had been,[48]it is likely that a western Empire would have been re-established, however permanently or impermanently, under Amal or Meroving rule.  Who can guess what might have become of Roman identity in that event?  I suspect that something closer to the fourth-century situation may have emerged, although it was unlikely to have represented a re-establishment of or reversion to precisely that state of affairs.
Such a decisive confrontation, of course, never took place.  Instead, possibly motivated by the developments around 510, the Constantinopolitan court began to emphasize its exclusive, Roman legitimacy and in time to attempt to re-impose political unity through its own military actions.  What made a crucial difference to these campaigns was the well-known Justinianic ideological offensive.  Famously this involved a rewriting of fifth-century history to portray the West as lost to barbarian invasions, which can be seen in works from Marcellinus Comes’ Chronicle, through at least the early books (though I would say all, to some extent) of Procopius Wars.[49]

The development of Roman Identity, c.550-c.625

The impact of the Justinianic Wars, and especially of the fact that they did not result in the West’s military domination by the eastern Emperor, cannot be overestimated.  After twenty years of brutal destructive warfare waged to make the point, no one could be in any doubt that the areas beyond actual imperial authority were not part of the Empire any more.  They remained lost to barbarians; the frontier between imperial Roman inside and outside had formally been redrawn.  As far as Roman identity in the West was concerned, this completely changed the game.  It did so for all sorts of identities, the traditional bases for which had to be redefined.  As is well-known, the Old Testament became a new source of models and ideals.[50]  What could be done with Roman identity though?
In this context it is not surprising to see the dramatic decline in Roman identity at the end of the sixth century in Gaul.  The parallel societies of Lex Salicadisappeared.  In the sixth century the personnel of the Gallic church was dominated by people with Roman names.  Around 600, that changed so that bishops overwhelmingly had Frankish names.  The episcopal list of Metz, for instance, reveals only a couple of non-Roman or non-biblical names before about 600.  After that the situation is reversed.  This is fairly typical for northern Gaul.[51] One might read that change in several ways.  The families who provided members of the episcopate changed their naming practices; the people entering the episcopate ceased to adopt Roman names as more appropriate to their status; or the Roman families that had provided the bishops dropped in status.  Either way, the significance of this change for Roman status remains and cannot be ignored.
This is also the period when Gregory of Tours was writing his Histories.  In this context I think it is unsurprising that Roman identity is conspicuous by its absence.  As Edward James says, Gregory does not self-identify as Romanus but as Arvernus.[52]  What might have been seen as the imaginary element of classical Roman identity is displaced into senatorial noble identity and into Christian behaviour.[53]  Otherwise Roman identity has defaulted to the level of the civitas identity as in the case of the embassies mentioned earlier.  It is no surprise that civitasidentifiers are mostly confined to the south.[54]This identity is no less ethnic than that of Frank.  Like all such identities, it could be the object of violence, as with the killing that broke out along the Loire after the death of Chilperic.[55] 
Gregory’s own rather sneering view of the men of Bourges further illustrates the point.[56]  A comparison of Gregory’s story of the foundation of the see of Bourges with that of his home town of Clermont reveals the men of Bourges to have been much more unwilling than the Auvergnats to receive the word of God.[57]  Only the intervention of a distant relative of Gregory’s even enables the embryonic church to acquire a place of worship.  After their deaths the burial places of the first bishops of both cities are forgotten but whereas the grave of Stremonius was revealed by a vision received by a future bishop of Clermont and his body translated in fairly standard fashion, at Bourges, Ursinus’ grave was only revealed after a member of the bishop’s staff received a cure (at St Martin’s , Tours, significantly) and even this revelation was disputed by the local bishop.  Only the intervention of St Germanus of Paris and further visions led to a translation.[58]
In contrast to the numerous saintly figures of Tours and Clermont catalogued by Gregory, the Berruyard holy men are fairly nondescript, and manifest a very frequent association with Tours, Clermont or St Martin.  Otherwise they are faintly ridiculous.  Witness Saint Marianus:[59] Marianus, a recluse, was found dead under an apple tree and consequently was rumoured to have died by falling out of a tree.  ‘But it was not known for certain because no one had been an eye-witness.’  Whatever the case, it was hardly the most dignified form of death for a holy man, and the locals, perhaps understandably enough from a modern point of view, were not over-impressed, in spite of unspecified healing miracles.  One local, rebuked for working on St Marianus’ feast day, angrily replied ‘Do you think that a man who slipped from a tree whilst satisfying his appetite has been included in the company of angels, so that he ought to be venerated as a saint?’  Needless to say, his house burnt down.  Only after another miracle, where some stolen oxen miraculously wandered home on their own, does Gregory say ‘after these events, the people of Bourges began to honour this confessor of God with more diligent concern.’  What better part of the world for a bogus holy man to emerge?  Towards the end of the Histories a man from Bourges is attacked by a swarm of flies and as a result goes mad.  Eventually, after a career which exactly parodies that of a proper holy man, he was killed by the pueri of the bishop of Le Puy.[60]  Clearly, identities like these, could operate in the register of the imaginary as well as the symbolic.  There is no way, analytically, of distinguishing these identities as somehow less ‘ethnic’ than those associated with the recognised ‘peoples’ of late antiquity.  Their status as a rung below more ‘gentile’ identities was only contingent upon the nature of fifth and sixth-century politics and the larger size of western kingdoms at that time. In some ways this was the golden age of civitasidentity.[61] 
Gregory is famously tacit about the end of the Roman Empire in Gaul.  What is less often remarked upon is the fact that he is at least as reticent about beginning of the Roman Empire in Gaul.[62]  Roman history, as one might expect, has been displaced in favour of Christian history.  The eschatological implications of this are unclear.  Obviously, after several centuries of Christian linkage of the Empire with the Sixth Age the end of the Roman Empire should have produced a great deal of concern about the end of the world, and in my view it did.  But Gregory’s precise position on this is vague.  His most overt statement on the issue can be read in diametrically opposed ways.[63]  Nonetheless he certainly had concerns, as the Preface to Book 5 of the Historiesmakes very clear.[64]
By around 600, then, it is difficult to see Roman identity in Gaul as a pole of attraction.  Much of its component elements had been displaced into other areas.  The ideal behaviour associated with legitimate political authority was no longer exclusively associated with Roman education and subjectivization.  One has to recall the oppositions and differences inherent in all identities.  For Roman identity in Gaul the key opposition involved the legal privilege, tax exemption and military-political avenues for advancement associated with Frankish identity.[65]  Such issues had, I suggest, less important implications for civitasidentity.  For one thing, there was no binary opposition between arvernusand Francus any more than there was between arvernus and arelatensis in the embassies mentioned by Gregory.  For another, civitas identity might coexist with Frankish in a nested way, as perhaps with Bobo and Bodegisel or the franci tornacenses of Book 10 of the Histories.[66]  For a third, in at least the southern parts of Merovingian Gaul, civitas identity was part and parcel of political and military activity.  Military service was structured differently.[67] 
If the components of identity are perpetually renegotiated but always already in existence, then the disadvantages of Roman identity in northern Gaul around 600 would be perceived as natural.  In that context it is not surprising that those who could had laid aside this level of identity and that those who could not had sunk to the level of a legally-dependent stratum of society.  It was possibly not until the category of the half-free Romanus had been absorbed within a general economically class of the dependent, perhaps by the later eighth century or perhaps earlier,[68]that Roman identity could again emerge as something to be stressed, created or fought for at high levels.
Clearly, the transformations of Romanness in late sixth-century northern Gaul were varied.  I have not mentioned the peculiarly Roman population of Trier.[69]  Nor have I mentioned the attempts by Chilperic I to incorporate traditional elements of legitimate Roman rule within the image of Frankish monarchy.[70]  Across the West that diversity would be magnified.  Seventh-century Spain for example shows some similarities with the Frankish situation and perhaps a more sustained attempt to adopt a solution similar to Chilperic’s.[71]  For Lombard Italy and Anglo-Saxon England we simply do not have the relevant data but general similarities might be suggested.

Conclusion

Roman identity had never been an immutable or monolithic identity – like any other identity it never could have been – and it is important that we early medievalists remember that.  Roman identity survived the supposed barbarian invasions of the fifth century in the West as perhaps diminished – temporarily inconvenienced – but nonetheless as an important resource in political activity.  The mid-sixth-century crisis associated with Justinian’s wars put an end to that.  However it was responded to, after that, Roman identity could not survive in anything like the old way.  In this as in so many other areas it seems correct to say that the post-Justinianic transformations that took place in the West around 600 marked the end of the Roman world.[72]


[1]See also G. Halsall, ‘Identity and otherness in the Merovingian cemetery’, in Identity and Otherness among the Barbarians in Europe during the Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: The problematic relationship between Texts and Archaeology ed. J. López Quiroga, M. Kazanski & V. Ivanisevic (forthcoming).
 
[2]I had actually made them in 1995 in Early Medieval Cemeteries (Glasgow, 1995), pp.56-58, but they are more fully worked through in Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376-568 (Cambridge, 2007), pp.35-45.
 
[3]P. Amory, People and Identity in Ostrogothic Italy, 489-554 (Cambridge 1997); P. Heather, ‘Gens and regnum among the Ostrogoths’ in(ed.) (2003). Regna and Gentes: The Relationship between late Antique and Early Medieval Peoples and Kingdoms in the Transformation of the Roman World ed. H.-W. Goetz, J. Jarnut, J., & W. Pohl (Leiden, 2003), pp.85-133; id. ‘‘Merely an ideology? Gothic identity in Ostrogothic Italy’, in The Ostrogoths from the Migration Period to the Sixth Century ed. S.J.B. Barnish &  F. Marazzi (Woodbridge, 2007, pp.31-60.
 
[4]The problem with the term is that it resonates with earlier uses of gentilismus in the literature.  However, it was felt that a term was necessary to specify the level of ethnicity concerned with named ‘peoples’, especially as the subtleties and many-layered nature of ‘ethnicity’ have become widely recognised.  For the problems of gentilismus, see W. Pohl, ‘Zur Bedeutung ethnischer Unterscheidungen in der frühen Karolingerzeit.’ Studien zur Sachsenforschung 12 (1999): 193-208 at pp.195-6.
 
[5] Derrida’s most accessible comments on these key issues may be found in J. Derrida & H. Ronse, Positions. (Paris, 1972) [English translation A. Bass, Positions (London, 2002).  Useful introductions to Derrida’s thought include: M. Dooley & L. Kavanagh, The philosophy of Derrida (Stocksfield, 2007); S. Glendinning, Derrida: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2011); C. Howells, Derrida: Deconstruction from phenomenology to ethics (Cambridge, 1998); B. Stocker, The Routledge Guide to Derrida and Deconstruction (London 2006).
 
[6] LH IV.40. Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum 1.1, ed. B. Krusch & W. Levison (Hanover, 1951); English translation: Gregory of Tours.History of the Franks trans. L. Thorpe (Harmondsworth, 1974).
 
[7]LH X.2
 
[8]Guy Halsall, Settlement and social Organisation: The Merovingian Region of Metz (Cambridge, 1995), pp.31, 39.
 
[9]I assume that Firminus, Evantius and (perhaps) Bodegisil were the people who in the Pactus Legis Salicae would be termed Romani– perhaps belonging to the evidently Roman category of conviviales regi.  Pactus Legis Salicae 41.8. Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Legum, Section 1, Vol.4, Pt 1, Pactus Legis Salicae ed. K.-A. Eckhardt (Hanover, 1962); The Laws of the Salian Franks, trans. K. Fischer Drew (Philadelphia 1991).
 
[10]These works included: W. Pohl, ‘Telling the Difference: Signs of ethnic identity’, in (1998). Strategies of Distinction.  The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300-800 ed. W. Pohl & H. Reimitz (Leiden, 1998), pp.17-69; id. ‘Conceptions of ethnicity in early medieval studies’, in Debating the Middle Ages, ed. L.K. Little & B.H. Rosenwein  (Oxford, 1998), pp.15-24; id. ‘Zur Bedeutung ethnischer Unterscheidungen in der frühen Karolingerzeit.’ (above, n.3); id. Die Völkerwanderung: Eroberung und Integration (Stuttgart, 2002); id., ‘Invasions and ethnic identity’ in Italy in the Early Middle Ages, ed. C. La Rocca (Oxford, 2002), pp.20-33; id., ‘Aux origins d’une Europe ethnique. Transformations d’identités entre Antiquité et Moyen Âge.’ Annales HSS(2005):188-208;  id. ‘Rome and the barbarians in the fifth century.’ Antiquité Tardive 16 (2008): 93-101.  I am grateful to Walter Pohl not only for copies of most of these works but also for tolerating this close reading of his oeuvre with good humour.  I must underline that, as any reader of Derrida’s work will know, a deconstructive reading is a mark of respect, of a text’s importance and influence.
 
[11]Pohl, ‘Telling the difference’, p.22.
 
[12]On the aporia in Derrida’s thinking, see N. Royle, Jacques Derrida(London, 2003), pp.92-93.
 
[13]W. Goffart, ‘Foreigners in the Histories of Gregory of Tours.’ Florilegium 4 (1982): 80-99. Reprinted in id., Rome’s Fall and After (London, 1989), no.11.  E. James, ‘Gregory of Tours and the Franks’, in After Rome’s Fall: Narrators and sources of Early Medieval History ed. A. Callander Murray (Toronto, 1998), pp.51-66.
 
[14]James, ‘Gregory of Tours and the Franks’, p.66.  James (p.60) says that Gregory writes of the identities ‘Frank’ and ‘Arvernian’ ‘as if they were equivalent ethnic terms’ but the implications of that point are left unexplored.
 
[15]The men of Champagne: Histories 5.3, 5.14, 8.18 (implicitly), 10.3, 10.27  There is a good discussion of Gregory’s references to civitates in P. Heather, ‘State, lordship and community in the west (c. AD 400-600)’, in Cambridge Ancient History vol.14: Empire and Successors, A.D.425-600, ed. A.M. Cameron, B. Ward-Perkins & M. Whitby (Cambridge, 2000), pp.437-68, at pp.441-3, 456. C. Lewis, ‘Gallic identity and the Gallic civitas from Caesar to Gregory of Tours’, in Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity, ed. S. Mitchell & G. Greatrex (London, 2000), pp.69-81.
 
[16]A.C. Murray, ‘Reinhard Wenskus on ‘Ethnogenesis’, ethnicity and the origin of the Franks’, in On Barbarian Identity: critical Approaches to Ethnicity in the Early Middle Ages, ed. A. Gillett (Turnhout, 2002), pp.39-68.
 
[17]W. Goffart, Barbarian Tides. The Migration Age and the Later Roman Empire (Philadelphia, 2006), pp.47, 198 etc.
 
[18]P. Geary, The Myth of Nations. The Medieval Origins of Europe (Princeton NJ, 2002), pp.63-73; Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, ed. R. Miles (London, 1999); Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity ed. Mitchell & Greatrex; G. Woolf, Becoming Roman. The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge, 1998); recently, J. Conant, Staying Roman. Conquest and Identity in Africa and the Mediterranean, 439-700 (Cambridge, 2012)
 
[19]I owe the term ‘taxonomic’ to Michael Kulikowski.  As late Roman examples of the genre, one can cite Ammianus’ ethnographic excursus on the people who live beyond the Danube (Res Gestae 22.8, 31.2), the Arabs (Res Gestae 14.4), and so on. Ammianus Marcellinus, trans. Rolfe, J.C., (London 1935-39) (3 vols.).
 
[20]Germania, 1-27 (structural discussion) and 28-46 (taxonomy).  Tacitus. Germania trans. J.B. Rives (Oxford, 1999)
 
[21]See above, p.000.
 
[22]Caesar, Gallic War, 6.21-24: Caesar: The Gallic War, ed. & trans. Edwards, H.J., (London, 1917).
 
[23]Thus Ammianus, Res Gestae 15.11-12, on the Gauls, or 23.15-16, on Egypt, differ little if at all from the excursus referred to at n.18.
 
[24]For example Ammianus Marcellinus’ excursus on the Gauls (above, n.18).
 
[25]See Ps.-Aurelius Victor, Origo Gentis Romanae: Pseudo-Aurelius Victor, Les Origines du People Romain ed. & French trans.  J.-C. Richard (Paris, 1983); English translation: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/origo_00_intro.htm(accessed 24 Nov., 2014).
 
[26]Goffart, Barbarian Tides p.1.
 
[27]E.g. PLS 14, 32, 41, 42.4,
 
[28]Lex Ribvaria 61.10-11; 61.19; 68.2-3; 69.  The necessity for a Frank to speak for Romans at law is attested in Lex Ribv. 68.3: Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Legum, Sect.1, Vol.3, Lex Ribvaria, ed. F. Beyerle & R. Buchner (Hanover, 1951); Engl. Trans. T.J. Rivers, The Laws of the Ripuarian Franks (New York, 1987)
 
[29]For an important discussion of some of these issues, see M. Kulikowski, ‘The failure of Roman arms’ in The Sack of Rome in 410 AD. The Event, its Context and its Impact. Proceedings of the Conference held at the German Archaeological Institute at Rome, 04-06 November 2010, ed. J. Lipps, C. Machado & P. von Rummel (Wiesbaden, 2013), pp.77-83.  On paideia, a good introduction is P.R.L. Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity. Towards a Christian Empire(Madison, 1992), pp.37-41.
 
[30]See, for example, Ausonius, Carmina108-113, where he mocks the notion of a good Briton: Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Auctores Antiquissimi, ed. C. Schenkl (Berlin 1883), p.225.  Rutilius Namatianus also suggests a view of Britons as barbarous (ferox): De Reditu Suo, line 500: Minor Latin Poets, Volume II, ed. & trans. J. Wight Duff and A.M. Duff, (London, 1934), pp753‑829.  Sidonius Apollinaris’ pride in the history of his fellow Arvernians is clear at Carmina7, line 139ff) and his resentment at the Gauls’ exclusion from the centre of politics, to the benefit of the Italians, is visible at Carmina 5, line 349 ff.  Sidonius: Poems and Letters, ed. & trans. Anderson W.B., vol.1 (London, 1936).  The non-Gallic Ammianus famously criticises Italians with reference to the Gauls at Res Gestae 15.12.3.
 
[31]Ausonius is an example: J.F. Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court AD 364-425 (reprint: Oxford, 1990), pp.81-82.   See also the case of Sidonius: J. Harries, Sidonius Apollinaris and the Fall of Rome(Oxford 1994), pp.27-35.  A classic statement of multi-layered Roman identity is Ausonius’ Order of Famous Cities, lines 40-41, about Ausonius’ two homelands: Bordeaux and Rome.
 
[32]In the seventh century, Fredegar identified a Frank as homo scarponnensis’ (i.e. from the pagus scarponensis, on the Moselle above Metz) Chron. IV.52.  The Fourth Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar with its Continuations ed. & trans. J.M. Wallace Hadrill (Oxford, 1960), p.43.
 
[33]Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, pp.39-40.
 
[34]See above, n.29 for Ausonius’ jibes.  Cassius Dio, Roman History78.6.1a: Dio’s Roman History, trans. E. Cary (9 vols.; London, 1914-27).
 
[35]Above, nn.18, 22.
 
[36]Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, pp. 106-8.
 
[37]The classic accounts of the geo-biological reasons for the Roman:barbarian difference are at Pliny, Natural History2.80.190; Vegetius, De Re Militari, 1.2; Vitruvius Architecture 6.1. Pliny: Natural History, ed. & trans. H. Rackham, W.J.S. Jones & D.E. Eichholz (10 vols.; London, 1938-62); Vegetius. Epitome of Military Science, trans. N.P. Milner (Liverpool, 1993). Vitruvius: On Architecture, ed. & trans. F. Granger (2 vols.; London, 1931-34).
 
[38]Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p.109.
 
[39]Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, pp.101-10.
 
[40]Kulikowski, ‘The failure of Roman arms’.
 
[41]Halsall, Barbarian Migrations 202-6, 266-7, 281, 408-9.
 
[42]Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, pp.475-6, 485-7, with references.
 
[43]Harries, Sidonius Apollinaris, pp.243-51. R.W. Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats in Barbarian Gaul. Strategies for Survival in an Age of Transition(Austin Tx, 1993).
 
[44]K. Cooper & C. Leyser, ‘The gender of grace’, in Gendering the Middle Ages ed. P. Stafford & A.B. Mulder-Bakker A.B., (Oxford, 2001), pp.6-21
 
[45]On the continuity of Roman titles, see A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284-602 (Oxford, 1964), pp.238-65; P.S. Barnwell, Emperor, Prefects and Kings. The Roman West, 395-565 (London, 1982).On the ‘Romanness’ of ‘barbarian’ rulers, see Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, pp.488-94.
 
[46]E.g. PLS 41.5, 41.8.
 
[47]Gregory, Histories, 2.38 for the acclamation of Clovis as augustus, which historians have generally rejected but on no clear grounds.  M. McCormick wisely leaves the issue open: ‘Clovis at Tours, Byzantine public ritual and the origins of medieval ruler symbolism’ in Das Reich und die Barbaren, ed. E. Chrysos & A. Schwarcz  (Vienna, 1989), pp.155-180.  On Theodosius’ description as augustus, see M. McCormick, Eternal Victory. Triumphal rulership in late antiquity, Byzantium and the early medieval West (Cambridge 1986), pp.278-80.
 
[48]Such as the battle of Vouillé (507).
 
[49]B. Croke, ‘476: The manufacture of a turning point.’ Chiron 13 (1983):81-119 (repr. in B. Croke, Christian Chronicles and Byzantine History, 5th-6th Century (London, 1992), no. V).  The historiographical tradition is most recently represented in the writings of Peter Heather, notably the somewhat ironically-subtitled The Fall of Rome: A New History (London, 2005).
 
[50]Y. Hen, ‘The uses of the Bible and the perception of kingship in Merovingian Gaul.’ Early Medieval Europe 7.3 (1998):277-90.
 
[51]Halsall, Settlement and Social Organization, pp.14-17, 29.  N. Gauthier, L’Évangélisation des Pays de la Moselle. La Province Romaine de Premiere Belgique entre Antiquité et Moyen-Âge (IIIe-VIIIe siècles) (Paris, 1980).
 
[52]James, ‘Gregory of Tours and the Franks’, p.66.
 
[53]A classic study is R. Van Dam, Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul (Berkeley, 1985).
 
[54]Heather, ‘State, lordship and community in the west’.
 
[55]Gregory, Histories, 7.2.
 
[56]Gregory, Histories, 1.30-31.  Gregory’s oppositional attitude doubtless relates to the fact that Bourges was the metropolitan see of Aquitanica Prima, the province in which Gregory’s home town of Clermont was located.
 
[57] Gregory, Glory of the Confessors 29. Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum 1, Part 2 ed. B. Krusch &W. Levison (Hannover, 1969), pp. 744–820; R. Van Dam (trans.), Gregory of Tours: Glory of the Confessors (Liverpool, 1988).
 
[58]Gregory, Glory of the Confessors 79.
 
[59] Gregory, Glory of the Confessors 80.
 
[60]Gregory, Histories 10.25.
 
[61]Lewis, ‘Gallic identity and the Gallic civitasfrom Caesar to Gregory of Tours’.  See also M. Handley, ‘Inscribing time and identity in the kingdom of Burgundy’, in Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity, ed. Mitchell & Greatrex, pp.83-102; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, pp.480-2.
 
[62]Cp. Gregory, Histories, 1.18 claims that Julius Caesar was the first emperor and mentions the foundation of Lyon but there is no overt statement about the conquest of Gaul.
 
[63]Gregory, Histories, 1.praef. G. de Nie, Views from a Many-Windowed Tower. Studies of Imagination in the Work of Gregory of Tours (Amsterdam, 1987), pp.57-59.
 
[64]Gregory, Histories V.praef.‘The preface to Book V of Gregory of Tours’ Histories: Its form, context and significance.’ English Historical Review 122 (April, 2007), pp.297-317.
 
[65]Halsall, Settlement and Social Organization, pp.26-31, 258; G. Halsall Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West 450-900 (London, 2003), pp.46-47.
 
[66]Gregory, Histories X.27
 
[67]Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, c.450-900 (London, 2003), p.48.
 
[68]Halsall, Settlement and Social Organisation, p.59
 
[69]Halsall, Cemeteries and Society in Merovingian Gaul. Selected Studies in History and Archaeology, 1992-2009(Leiden, 2010), pp.225-229, 258.  See also Jamie Kreimer’s paper in this volume.
 
[70]Histories 5.17, 5.44, 6.2, 6.46
 
[71]On Isidore of Seville, see J. Wood, The Politics of Identity in Visigothic Spain. Religion and Power in the Histories of Isidore of Seville (Leiden, 2012).
 
[72]This is the title of a project I am currently working on, for which I received generous support in the form of a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship in 2009-12.

Thursday, 10 October 2013

La Compétition dans les Sociétés du haut Moyen-Age: Aspects matériaux et idéologiques

[This is the paper I presented at a conference in Rome last week on La Compétition dans les Sociétés du haut Moyen-Age, held at the École Française de Rome and the Universtà di Rome Tre.  Many thanks to Régine Le Jan for the invitation.  I wrote it straight into 'French' (though I'm grateful to Giusto Traina and to my partner, to whom we'll just refer as Dr Bossy, for translating it from that into actual French) so I don't have an English text to post.  I will add an English précis later.]

Dans l’antiquité tardive et au haut moyen-âge l’immatériel pouvait être estimé à un prix plus cher que le matériel.  Il suffit par exemple de rappeler la figure du sanctus, le saint homme, qui rejette absolument la richesse matérielle et qui le fait avec autant d’ostentation que le noble, somptueusement vêtu, manifestant son statut social devant ses rivaux à la cour du roi ou dans l’armée.  De ces deux hommes, il est difficile de dire lequel montre le plus grand pouvoir: l’aristocrate riche et puissant devant le roi, ou le saint homme, manifestement pauvre, devant Dieu.

Au haut moyen-âge on ne se limitait pas à se disputer des richesses matérielles, mais aussi de ressources immatérielles voire idéologiques.  Ceci est bien connu et pourtant je me vois obligé de rappeler quelques notions de base.  D ‘abord, l’économie du haut moyen-âge présente des différences significatives par rapport à l’économie moderne.  On ne peut parler d’économie monétaire, car les relations passaient régulièrement par des échanges de dons; les liens sociaux se fondaient fréquemment sur ces échanges et ainsi de suite.  Même si désormais ces constats sont acquis par les historiens il me semble que nous avons trop tendance à mettre l’accent sur l’aspect matériel des ressources.  Pour cette raison je voudrais développer les implications de ces idées : penser les aspects immatériels des ressources dans la politique altimédiévale pourrait avoir des implications plus profondes et de plus longue portée que nous avons peut-être imaginé.  Quand nous considérons la compétition dans les sociétés du haut Moyen-âge il convient de réévaluer les relations entre les ressources matérielles et les ressources idéologiques ou immatérielles.

Je voudrais commencer avec le fameux titre 36.11 de la Lex Ribvaria.  En précisant comment payer les amendes, les wergelds, ce titre présente une liste d’équivalences.  J’ai traduit le texte de l’édition MGH.

Un taureau cornu voyant, en bonne santé vaut 2 solidi
Une vache cornue, voyante en bonne santé - 3 solidi
Un étalon voyant, en bonne santé, vaut 12 solidi
Une jument voyante, en bonne santé - 3 solidi
Une épée avec son fourreau vaut 7 solidi
Une épée sans fourreau - 3 solidi
Un bon haubert vaut 12 solidi
Un casque – 6 solidi
De bons bagnbergas­ (ce terme fait référence à une sorte d’armure pour les jambes mais on ne dispose pas d’informations plus précises) - 6 solidi
Lance et bouclier – 2 solidi  ... etc.

À base de cette liste il est possible de constater certaines équivalences de valeur.  Renée Doehaerdt, par exemple, a proposé une telle interprétation de ce titre.  Une épée avec son fourreau valait trois taureaux et demi, ou deux taureaux et une vache.  Un étalon valait quatre vaches.  Un équipement complet de guerrier coûtait 45 solidi, c’est à dire 15 vaches, ou 22 taureaux, un petit troupeau de bétail.  On en a fréquemment déduit que l’équipement militaire était très coûteux à l’époque et donc devait être réservé aux riches, aux aristocrates.

Cette conclusion n’est pas fausse, mais à mon avis elle est fondée en partie sur une erreur.   C’est à dire que le solidus n’était pas une unité standardisée, comme l’euro ou le livre d’aujourd’hui.  Le solidus n’était pas un moyen neutre d’échange.  De nos jours, n’importe quel objet peut être évalué à un certain nombre d’euros; on peut comparer deux objets par rapport à leur prix.  Quelque chose qui coûte 10 euros est donc deux fois plus cher, ou plus valable, que quelque chose qui ne coûte que 5 euros, etc.  Si j’avais le temps je pourrais calculer mon salaire, payé en livres Sterling, en Mars-bars.  Avec une telle somme d’argent on peut acheter soit des milliers de Mars bars soit un professeur d’histoire médiévale.

Mais les choses étaient tout-à-fait différentes au haut moyen-âge.  Il y avait, évidemment très peu de solidien Gaule quand la Lex Ribvaria était rédigée: le solidus était alors une simple unité de compte.  Les évaluations de la Loi Ripuaire tenaient compte non seulement du prix des objets ou de leur valeur intrinsèque mais de leur valeur sociale.  L’importance de la valeur sociale de l’objet est illustré par le fait que les forgerons (et les fabricants de fourreaux) n’étaient pas les super-riches du haut-moyen-âge!  La différence entre le prix d’une épée avec fourreau et celui d’une épée sans fourreau en est un exemple; la présence du fourreau double le prix de l’épée. Les évaluations de la loi tiennent compte aussi de la valeur sociale des objets.  Par ‘valeur social’ je veux dire les choses, les actions, les activités qui sont mises à la disposition de celui qui possède l’objet.  Par exemple, la possession d’une douzaine de vaches ne permettait au propriétaire que la participation dans les activités des pâtres.  Par contre, la possession d’une épée ouvrait la voie à la participation dans l’armée, c’est-à-dire dans l’institution politique la plus importante de l’époque.  Si on possédait une épée on pouvait ainsi rencontrer des hommes puissants et établir des relations avec eux.  Dans la société occidentale moderne, on peut fonder sa fortune sur n’importe quel genre de biens – les vaches, le pain, les stylos – et on peut devenir ainsi millionnaire ou conseiller d’état.  Ce n’était pas (ou très rarement) le cas au haut moyen-âge quand on prêtait plus attention à quel type de richesse on possédait.

On pouvait, bien-sûr, utiliser les vaches, les taureaux etc., comme des dons pour établir des liens sociaux, pour créer un réseau d’alliés, ou pour s’assurer du soutien dans la communauté locale.  Il faut cependant souligner le fait que ce genre de don ne marchait qu’à un niveau social inférieur.  Par contre, le don d’une épée ou d’un harnachement étaient fort estimés à des niveaux sociaux plus élevés.

Il existe plusieurs chartes où un laïc donne une terre à un monastère et reçoit un cheval en retour.  On ne devrait pas pour autant conclure – comme je l’ai fait moi-même il y a dix ans! – qu’un cheval avait la même valeur qu’une parcelle de terre.  Cela ne veut pas dire que les chevaux ne coûtaient pas chers à l’époque. Il faut se souvenir du fait que les chevaux étaient très vulnérables pendant les campagnes militaires, vulnérables à des maladies, à des blessures, etc.   Pour cette raison, beaucoup de campagnes ont été coûteuses en chevaux.  Les guerriers riches avaient donc plusieurs chevaux.  Si un cheval avait coûté l’équivalent d’un terrain, d’une assiette foncière, il est difficile d’imaginer comment les armées auraient pu comprendre des centaines – ou des milliers – de guerriers montés, beaucoup d’entre eux avec deux chevaux ou plus.   Ce qui compte dans ces échanges est la création de liens sociaux et politiques entre le laïc et le monastère.  La charte conserve la mémoire de ce lien autant qu’elle confirme le transfert légal de propriété foncière.  La possession d’un cheval (ou probablement un cheval de plus) permettait, ou rendait plus pratique, la participation de l’individu dans l’armée, et c’était le symbole même de cette possibilité.  Donc on devrait voir ces échanges comme des actes d’importance socio-politique et non seulement comme de simples transactions matérielles ou économiques.  Je dirais même que pour les hommes du moyen âge c’était l’importance sociale qui pesait le plus lourd.

L’autre aspect de ces échanges est la cérémonie, le rituel.  Pour les raisons que je viens d’esquisser, le rôle de la cérémonie était parfois plus important que la valeur économique des objets échangées.  La cérémonie se déroule devant des témoins tirés des notables de la société locale.  On démontrait ainsi les relations établies par cet acte: l’association avec le monastère, la protection peut-être de ce dernier, la puissance du monastère, la portée de son patronat, etc. 

Je voudrais poursuivre ces idées à travers une considération des chartes précoces Mérovingiennes.  J’ai choisi des chartes royales du septième siècle, éditées par Theo Kölzer, et des chartes de l’abbaye de Wissembourg en Alsace, éditées par Glöckner et Doll.  Il faudrait d’abord souligner le fait que je ne propose pas de conclusions valables pour toutes les chartes médiévales.  À mon avis, on ne devrait pas imaginer la charte comme un genre qui n’évolue pas dans le temps et dans l’espace, mais au contraire comme une production quasi-littéraire qui répondait à des changements sociaux et politiques.  Ce que je vais dire sur les chartes Mérovingiennes du septième et huitième siècle précoce n’est pas valable même pour celles du huitième siècle tardif, sans parler d’autres régions comme l’Angleterre anglo-saxonne ou d’autres périodes plus tardives. 

Il est intéressant de noter que ces chartes précoces précisent très rarement quels biens matériels ont été donnés ou échangés.  Il paraît que les relations créées par l’acte importaient beaucoup plus que les objets donnés.  Pendant la plupart du septième siècle, les chartes royales authentiques sont majoritairement des confirmations de dons aristocratiques. Les chartes de fondation pour Stavelot-Malmédy sont exceptionnelles par leur description de la forêt et de son étendue, et par la précision qu’on est allé autour de l’aire donnée de la forêt, en marquant ses bornes.  La majorité des chartes ne parlent que des choses en générale, comme dans la formule una cum mansis, domibus seu mancipiis vel accolis ibidem commanentibus seu campis pratis pascuis siluis et forastis. J’ai tiré cette phrase d’une charte de Wissembourg rédigé en 713, mais l’expression est assez typique.  Cette charte de Wissembourg précise que le terrain donné se situait entre deux ou trois petites rivières et une voie ou point de repère, et que la partie donnée des forastis comprenait la moitié de la forêt.  Elle précise également que le donateur transfert un quart de sa portion de ses terres dans les Vosges.  Pourtant, en générale, l’absence d’informations dans les chartes est typique. On n’y fait guère mention, par exemple, du nombre ou de l’étendue des mansi, campi et prati donnés, ni des bornes de ces territoires ; il est de même pour le nombre (et les noms) des mancipiiet accolae.  Les noms des mancipii apparaissent assez fréquemment dans ces chartes, mais les informations précises des propriétés foncières ne sont presque jamais mentionnées.

Ce silence est frappant.  On doit imaginer que d’autres documents ou du savoir local (la mémoire des boni homines) devait être invoqués pour que les chartes aient une valeur légale en cas de dispute.  Mais ces informations ou précisions n’ont laissé aucune trace dans la documentation qui nous reste.  Le document qu’on gardait le plus, avec l’intention évidente de le garder à jamais, était la charte confirmant la relation entre le donateur et le monastère.  Ce fait pourrait modifier, de manière subtile mais significative, comment nous interprétons ces documents.  Il donne à réfléchir aux historiens, comme moi par exemple, qui ont utilisé ces chartes pour étudier les détails de la propriété aristocratique (ou monastique), le pouvoir fondé sur la terre, les notions contemporaines de l’habitat, et les communautés rurales.  Je ne dis absolument pas qu’il n’y avait pas de don réel de terres etc. derrière ces chartes. Il est néanmoins possible que le contrôle des ressources foncières soit plus lâche à cette époque précoce qu’on n’a imaginé.  Quoi qu’il en soit, ce que je trouve assez surprenant, est le fait que les contemporains n’ont pas conservé les détails des terres données.  Si on compare ces chartes aux documents compris dans les formulaires, cette conclusion devient plus remarquable.  Les documents modèles des formulaires sont obsédés par les détails légaux des transactions.  Tout se passe comme si les auteurs des chartes avaient adopté ces formules et les avaient copiées directement, sans insérer les détails imaginés par les auteurs de ces derniers.  Les intentions des auteurs des formulaires semblent donc très différentes de celles des auteurs des chartes.  Les chartes conservent la mémoire de l’acte de donation, de la cérémonie et des relations socio-politiques ainsi créées.  Donc il parait que ce qui comptait le plus pour ceux qui participaient dans ces échanges était les relations socio-politiques, l’immatériel plutôt que le matériel.  Ceci changeait pendant le huitième siècle, sans doute.   On trouve des informations de plus en plus précises dans les chartes de cette époque.  La gestion des terres par les monastères devient plus serrée à la fin du huitième et au cours du neuvième siècle.

On peut tirer des conclusions semblables pour les soumissions aux rois francs des ducs ou des princes des pays limitrophes, comme l’ont souligné beaucoup d’historiens: chaque partie gagne.  Les rois ou les empereurs manifestent aux hommes importants du royaume (qui étaient peut-être leurs concurrents pour le pouvoir), la puissance royale, en faisant soumettre des princes à leur autorité; les princes, de leur côté, montrent à leurs propres aristocrates qu’ils ont le soutien du roi.

Je suis arrivé à ces observations après une étude de la guerre et de la prédation que j’ai entrepris pour un colloque qui a eu lieu à Francfort l’année dernière.  L’historiographie de la guerre au haut moyen-âge et celle de l’habitat et de l’économie ont suivi toutes les deux des trajets assez différents ; il est donc intéressant de les faire confronter.  Une telle confrontation découvre quelques problèmes de l’histoire traditionnelle de la guerre et de la politique.  On imagine souvent qu’on a fait la guerre pour prendre le butin de l’ennemi.  Ce butin fournit aux rois des dons pour des aristocrates puissants, ces aristocrates peuvent ainsi faire des dons à leur tour à leurs adhérents, etc.  Dans cette perspective, c’était le butin qui a huilé la machine politique du royaume haut-médiéval.  D’après la thèse célèbre de Timothy Reuter, l’absence de guerre a entrainé le déclin du royaume ouest-franc au neuvième siècle.  Par contre, le royaume est-franc pouvait mener des guerres contre les Slaves, par exemple, et donc est resté plus fort.  On pourrait proposer des hypothèses semblables pour d’autres royaumes du haut moyen-âge: l’Espagne Wisigothique, par exemple.  Ça va sans le dire qu’il s’agit ici d’une thèse et d’un historien exceptionnels, mais il y a quelques problèmes avec cet argument.  Quand on tient compte des données archéologiques on a raison de demander d’où venait ce butin.  Pendant beaucoup du haut moyen-âge, avant le neuvième siècle, les habitats ruraux étaient assez pauvres; il n’existait pas de grandes villes commerciales, même les habitats aristocratiques ne laissaient pas de traces matérielles riches; seules les monastères et les grandes églises contenaient des richesses, et les armées chrétiennes ne saccageaient pas ces bâtiments sacrés – ou au moins on ne les saccageait pas d’habitude!  Il y a environ treize ans, à un colloque à Birmingham, Chris Wickham a comparé la fréquence des invasions franques de l’Italie et la pauvreté matérielle des habitats de l’Italie du nord.  Dans sa communication, il s’est posé la question de ce que les Francs ont pillé dans ce paysage.  On pourrait plaisanter en disant que la pauvreté archéologique de la région manifeste le succès et la rigueur des pilleurs francs, mais l’absence de donnés archéologiques pose un problème historiographique réel. En plus, beaucoup, même la plupart, des campagnes militaires se conduisaient dans des paysages frontalières pauvres, comme les territoires Basques des Pyrénées, la marche Bretonne, la frontière slave, les marches anglo-galloises.

Donc il semble probable que les razzias ne pouvaient pas produire un riche butin.  Pour gagner ce genre de butin il fallait battre l’armée ennemie, ou la réduire à la soumission.  Les guerriers prenaient leurs richesses avec eux, en forme d’armes et d’harnachement somptueusement décorés, en forme de vêtements riches, et en forme de chevaux avec harnachement richement orné.  Également, les rois amenaient leurs trésors avec eux, comme beaucoup d’histoires le confirment.  Charles le Chauve – commandant fort et créateur mais peu heureux – a deux fois perdu son trésor après une défaite, une fois contre les Bretons, et une fois contre son neveu, Louis le Jeune.  Les annalesde Fulda décrivent cette dernière défaite en détail, mentionnant des vendeurs de boucliers et d’autres négociants qui suivaient l’armée de Charles.  De plus, une interprétation séduisante du Staffordshire Hoard est que les objets dans ce trésor faisaient partie d’un tribut payé aux vainqueurs après une bataille.  Beaucoup de ces objets sont des appliqués, brisés brusquement par une poignée d’épée.

Ceci dit, les batailles étant assez rares, même si elles étaient plus fréquentes qu’à des époques plus récentes. Il est donc question de savoir pourquoi les rois sont allés en campagne si souvent.  Pourquoi les aristocrates ont-ils voulu aller en guerre?  Et ce qui est clair est qu’ils l’ont bien voulu; on pourrait citer des cas fameux d’aristocrates francs du sixième siècle qui menaçaient avec violence leurs rois afin qu’ils leur mènent en campagne - même des rois redoutables comme Thierry I et Chlothaire I !  Il me semble que l’explication de la fréquence de ces campagnes devrait reconnaître l’importance des ressources immatérielles qu’on pouvait gagner en faisant la guerre: à savoir, le patronat du roi ou des aristocrates les plus puissants ; l’opportunité de faire preuve de dextérité avec les armes, ou de son habilité stratégique ou tactique ; l’occasion de se montrer fort, hardi, courageux, fidèle.  On doit se souvenir de la base belliqueuse ou militaire sur laquelle se reposait tant d’identités du haut moyen-âge: l’ethnicité franque (ou gothe, ou lombarde), la masculinité, la noblesse.  Comment serait-il possible de démontrer qu’on occupait une telle position dans la société sans aller en campagne de temps en temps, sans faire preuve de ces bases fondamentales de l’identité?  Il faut également tenir en compte le fait que l’armée était la principale institution politique du royaume.  Faire partie de l’armée, c’est participer à la politique.  Dans l’armée on pouvait renouveler des liens avec ses alliés et ses subordonnés, on pouvait recevoir des titres, des honores et d’autres faveurs du roi.  On pouvait grimper l’échelle sociale.

L’affaire célèbre de Matfrid et Hugo en 827 trouble la thèse de Reuter mais soutient l’interprétation que je viens de proposer.  Louis le Pieux a dirigé Matfrid et Hugo à la marche hispanique pour combattre une invasion par les Musulmans de l’Espagne, mais ces deux hommes ont assemblé une armée et ils ont marché si lentement que l’affaire était terminé avant leur arrivée.  Si le butin était le sine qua non de la politique, pourquoi est-ce qu’ils auraient hésité?  L’Espagne était une région plus riche que les autre pays limitrophes de l’empire Carolingien.  Si on suit la thèse de Reuter, ceci aurait été une opportunité excellente de prendre du butin et de revenir à la cour avec des trésors que Matfrid et Hugo auraient pu utiliser ensuite pour assurer leur prééminence auprès du roi.  Mais faire la guerre en Espagne signifiait l’éloignement du centre politique du royaume ;  on courait ainsi le risque de perdre la faveur de l’empereur et d’abandonner le principal champ de lutte politique à ses rivaux. Accompagner l’empereur en campagne, c’est important pour toutes les raisons que je viens de décrire; pourtant, conduire une campagne loin de son empereur et de ses rivaux, c’est toute autre chose.

Revenons donc à la soumission des chefs, des princes ou même des rois gouvernant des territoires ou des peuples périphériques: des Basques, par exemple, des Bretons, des Saxons peut-être.  Les Saxons payaient un tribut de 500 vaches par an.  Il est difficile d’imaginer qu’un roi Mérovingien comme Chlothaire I ait beaucoup prisé un don de 500 vaches, étant donné ses vastes ressources.  Qu’est-ce que les chefs Basques ont donné aux rois Wisigothiques ou Francs quand les armées franques ou gothes ravageaient leurs territoires?  Des moutons peut-être?  Du fromage?  Quelles richesses ont les rois mineurs Gallois données au roi de Mercia?  Je voudrais suggérer que le contenu précis du tribut importait beaucoup moins que l’acterituel de donation, de soumission, observé par les grands des deux royaumes.  Il y a deux histoires qui suggèrent que les objets acquis en campagne pouvaient être restitués aux propriétaires.  La Vie du saint anglo-saxon Guthlac fait mention de son remboursement d’un tiers du butin qu’il avait pris dans ses campagnes.  La célèbre histoire du vase de Soissons fait également penser à la possibilité, au moins, du retour d’objets valables pillés par des bandes de guerriers.

Enfin, je reviens aux chartes Mérovingiennes.  Serait-il possible d’imaginer que les terres et d’autres ressources données aux monastères étaient moins importantes que l’acte de donation?  Et que cette importance relative se laisse apercevoir par l’absence de détail dans ces documents, une absence qui peut surprendre d’un point de vue légal? 

Je suggère que le capital le plus important qui circulait dans l’économie du haut moyen-âge jusqu’au neuvième siècle, qui circulait derrière la liste des prix ou des équivalences de la Loi Ripuaire, était le capital social et politique.  Bien entendu, ce type de capital prenait une forme matérielle, mais la relation entre le capital matériel et le capital social n’était pas toujours directe, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.  Le capital matériel et le capital social pouvaient être associés de façon purement symbolique ou métonymique.  Les objets pouvaient être, pour employer une expression anglaise philosophique, des ‘placeholders’ pour des relations sociales.  Évidemment l’importance des relations établies par un don, ou le statut des personnages ainsi liés, pouvaient se traduire par la valeur des objets échangés.  Faire ce lien entre la valeur matérielle et la valeur sociale du don serait même la norme.  Cependant, je voudrais briser la relation automatique ou nécessaire entre ces deux éléments.  Il est possible que des objets qui nous semblent assez banales, comme des boucles de ceinture (qui étaient très simples au sixième siècle), aient porté un symbolisme riche en signification sociale.  Si on peut se fier au témoignage de la Loi Ripuaire, le fourreau était aussi valable que l’épée.  Des objets pouvaient porter en eux des mémoires, des traditions, des histoires; ils pouvaient agir, pour parler ainsi, sur des acteurs humains de l’époque, sans que la valeur intrinsèque de ces objets soit évidente aux chercheurs modernes.  On pouvait naturellement rapprocher ces deux aspects du don, avec, par exemple, l’ornementation des reliques et de leurs châsses.  Mais pas toujours.  Prenons, par exemple, la sainte lance conservée à la Schatzkammer à Vienne, avec son étiquette amusante: “Heilige Lanze (Karolingische: 8. Jahrhundert)”.  Ce n’est qu’un fer de lance assez banale mais ... c’est la sainte lance.

Je suggère que les objets signifiaient none seulement les relations formelles, les rôles &c. mais aussi ce que ces relations, ces rôles devaient ou même pouvaient être.  C’est à dire, dans la vocabulaire de Jacques Lacan, qu’ils fonctionnaient non seulement dans le champ du symbolique mais aussi dans le champ de l’imaginaire.  Ceci ouvre un espace de signification qui ne pouvait être rempli par le simple valeur matérielle ou sociale ou la fonctionnalité.

En conclusion, je ne veux pas suggérer que les objets de valeur matérielle n’étaient pas estimés par les hommes du moyen âge.  Je ne pense pas qu’il n’y ait pas de rapport entre la valeur intrinsèque d’un objet et l’importance, soit des personnes qui les possèdent, soit des relations sociales établies ou manifestées par le don d’un tel objet.  Je ne soutiens pas l’hypothèse que la compétition sociale ne concernait pas les choses matérielles, ou les bases foncières de la production. 


Ce que je propose est simplement quelques modifications à l’interprétation de la compétition socio-politique du haut moyen-âge.  Je voudrais d’abord briser le lien souvent imaginé entre la valeur monétaire ou matérielle et la valeur sociale d’un objet ou d’une ressource.  Nous devrions mettre l’accent plus souvent sur les ressources sociales ou politiques – l’immatériel, l’idéologique.  Au haut moyen-âge on se rivalisait pour des choses intangibles: le patronat, le soutien, l’alliance.  Ces ressources étaient peut-être plus limitées que les ressources matérielles.  En fin de compte il existait un ‘zero-sum game’ concernant l’accès à ces ressources, bien que beaucoup d’historiens  aient justement mis en question l’existence d’un tel jeu en ce qui concerne les ressources matérielles.  A cette époque, on pouvait partager des biens matériels, des assiettes fiscales et foncières, des forêts, des revenus des terres, des services.  C’était beaucoup plus difficile de partager l’importance, l’influence, le privilège, la préséance – les choses qui dominaient la politique du haut moyen-âge et qui gouvernaient ses dynamiques.  Au point de vue des ressources immatérielles, la compétition dans les sociétés du haut moyen-âge était plus acharnée que nous l’avons imaginé.